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11 Francis Ysidro Edgeworth
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926) was a leading ﬁgure in the rapid development of
economics during the last quarter of the 19th century and the ﬁrst quarter of the 20th
century. He held the Drummond Chair at Oxford from 1891 and was regarded as second
only to the great Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall. He was a proliﬁc and highly original
author who, in a cosmopolitan age, had probably the widest correspondence with economists
all over the world.1 He was a man of enormously wide reading and considerable linguistic
skills. He was the ﬁrst editor of the Economic Journal, published by the newly formed
Royal Economic Society. He was President of Section F of the British Association in 1889
and 1922. He achieved eminence as a statistician as well as an economist, becoming a Guy
Medallist (Gold) of the Royal Statistical Society in 1907 and was President of the Society,
1912-14. Indeed, of about 170 papers, roughly three-quarters are concerned with statistical
theory.2
His name is familiar to all economists, if only because of the ‘Edgeworth box’, one of the
most widely used analytical devices in the subject. This diagrammatic tool was introduced
b yE d g e w o r t hi n1 8 8 1i nh i sﬁrst publication in economics, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay
on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. This small book is remarkable
for its highly original and far-reaching contributions to economics; indeed Marshall began
his review with the statement that, ‘This book shows clear signs of genius’. However, it was
written in such a terse and unique style that it took many years before its contributions
w e r ef u l l ya p p r e c i a t e d ,d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tE d g e w o r t hb e c a m eo n eo ft h em o s tp r o m i n e n t
economists of his age. The title itself does not clearly signal a book on economics, and his
use of sophisticated mathematics put it well beyond the reach of most of the economists of
the period. The technical diﬃculty of much of his published output contributed to its slow
assimilation into text books and he continues to remain relatively neglected in texts on the
history of economic analysis.
Mathematical Psychics provides the key to all his later work and his lasting importance
1For a full-length treatment of Edgeworth’s economics, see Creedy (1986), and for a biography, see Barbé
(2010).
2His main contributions to statistics concern work on inference and the ‘law of error’, the correlation
coeﬃcient, transformations (what he called ‘methods of translation’), and the ‘Edgeworth expansion’. The
latter, a series expansion which provides an alternative to the Pearson family of distributions, has been widely
used (particularly since the work of Sargan, 1976) to improve on the central limit theorem in approximating
sampling distributions. It has also been used to provide support for the bootstrap in providing an Edgeworth
correction. His third and ﬁnal book was Metretike: or the Method of Measuring Probability and Utility
(1887). These contributions are not examined here; see Bowley (1928) and Stigler (1978). Edgeworth’s
work in probability and statistics has been collected by McCann (ed.) (1996).
2to economics. He wrote extensively on a wide range of topics, but the central theme of
Edgeworth’s work is clear in his revealing statement, taken from his Presidential address to
Section F of the Royal Society, that:
I tm a yb es a i dt h a ti np u r ee c o n o m i c st h e r ei so n l yo n ef u n d a m e n t a lt h e o r e m ,
but that is a very diﬃcult one: the theory of bargain in a wide sense. (1925, ii,
p.288)
Taking as his starting point Jevons’s (1871, in 1957) basic analysis of exchange of two
goods between two traders, Edgeworth supposed that the objective of each trader is to
maximise utility, considered to be a general function of the quantities of the goods held
and consumed after trade is concluded. The utility-maximising approach was immediately
congenial to Edgeworth, who was steeped in Utilitiarian moral philosophy. He ﬁrst concen-
trated on the nature of barter, instead of describing the characteristics of an equilibrium
set of prices, that is, one which ensures that the individuals’ responses are mutually consis-
tent. If the traders in barter are allowed freely to vary the terms of provisional ‘contracts’,
Edgeworth showed that there is a range of ‘ﬁnal settlements’, from which no further ‘recon-
tracting’ would take place. In a rectangular box where the base and height are determined
by the initial stocks of the two goods, these ﬁnal settlements deﬁne what Edgeworth called
the ‘contract curve’. These settlements are also eﬃcient trades, in the sense that if a settle-
ment is not on the contract curve, movement to it can make one person better oﬀ without
the other being worse oﬀ: this original idea of eﬃciency later came to be called Pareto
eﬃciency. Movement along the contract curve involves one trader becoming worse oﬀ while
the other gains.
Edgeworth then deﬁned indiﬀerence curves for a trader as showing combinations of
amounts consumed for which utility is constant. Using several approaches, he demonstrated
that the contract curve is the locus of points of tangency between traders’ indiﬀerence curves,
between limits given by their pre-trade curves (those going through the initial endowment
p o i n ti nt h eb o x ) .T h ee x i s t e n c eo far a n g eo fﬁnal settlements has important implications.
First, without introducing further structure to the barter framework, it is not possible to
say what the implied rate of exchange is, given only information about preferences and
endowments of individuals. It results in ‘indeterminacy’ whereby all that can be said is that
the actual trade depends on the relative bargaining strength of the traders.
On the argument that such higgling is widespread, Edgeworth stated in his unique style
that, ‘The whole creation groans and yearns, desiderating a principle of arbitration, and
3end of strifes’ (1881, p.51). His next argument involved two steps. First, he showed that
the Utilitarian principle of maximising total utility places individuals on the contract curve,
because the mathematical conditions are equivalent to the tangency of indiﬀerence curves.
Indeed, if it is possible to make someone better oﬀ without someone being worse oﬀ,t o t a l
utility cannot be a maximum and individuals cannot be on the contract curve. While this
may seem a small step, to Edgeworth it was of great signiﬁcance:
It is a circumstance of momentous interest that one of the in general indeﬁnitely
numerous settlements between contractors is the utilitarian arrangement ... the
contract tending to the greatest possible total utility of the contractors. (1881,
p.53)
However, he recognized that this result is not suﬃcient to justify the use of Utilitarianism
as a principle of arbitration; it is only a necessary condition. Edgeworth’s justiﬁcation for
Utilitarianism as a principle of justice, comparing points along the contract curve, was as
follows:
Now these positions lie in a reverse order of desirability for each party; and
it may seem to each that as he cannot have his own way, in the absence of
any deﬁnite principle of selection, he has about as good a chance of one of the
arrangements as another ... both parties may agree to commute their chance of
any of the arrangements for ... the utilitarian arrangement. (1881, p.55)
T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n tt os t r e s sa b o u tt h i ss t a t e ment is that Edgeworth clearly considered
willingness to accept the Utilitarian arbitration in terms of choice under uncertainty. His
argument is that the contractors, faced with uncertainty about their prospects but viewing
alternatives along the contract curve as equally likely, would choose to accept an arrange-
ment along Utilitarian lines. Thus a crucial component of this argument is the use of equal
ap r i o r iprobabilities, something that was later important to Edgeworth in his statistical
w o r k . I nt a k i n gt h i ss e c o n ds t e pE d g e w o r t hb e l i e v e dt h a th eh a dp r o v i d e da na n s w e rt o
an age old question, stating, ‘by what mechanism the force of self-love can be applied so
as to support the structure of utilitarian politics, neither Helvetius, nor Bentham, nor any
deductive egoist has made clear’ (1881, p.128).
T h ei m p o r t a n c et oh i mo ft h i sn e wj u s t i ﬁcation of Utilitarianism cannot be exaggerated.
Indeed the whole of Mathematical Psychics seems to be imbued with a feeling of excitement
generated by his discovery of this justiﬁcation based on a ‘social contract’. This provided
4the crucial link between ‘impure’ and ‘pure’ utilitarianism in a more satisfactory way than
his earlier appeal to evolutionary forces, made in his book on New and Old Methods of
Ethics, written in 1877, before turning to economics.
The nature of price-taking behaviour — involving an equimarginal principle whereby the
ratio of prices must be equal, for both traders, to the ratio of their marginal utilities for
each of the relevant goods, had been explored with great originality by Jevons with his
‘equations of exchange’. Edgeworth made important extensions to this analysis, as well as
providing his succinct diagrammatical synthesis (which included showing, in 1881, p. 113,
how Marshall’s ‘oﬀer curves’ can be derived from indiﬀerence curves). He showed how his
box diagram can be used to illustrate a price-taking equilibrium. This arises where one
or more of the mutual tangency positions of indiﬀerence curves along the contract curve
also corresponds to tangency with a straight line going through the endowment point. This
line represents a common budget constraint for the choices of the individuals, whereby the
slope represents the exchange ratio and hence the relative price. In equilibrium, individuals
acting in isolation and taking prices as given (in contrast to those engaged in barter) have
mutually consistent demands and supplies. A price-taking equilibrium, as such a tangency
position, must therefore correspond to a point on the contract curve.
Edgeworth was thus able to clarify the sense in which a price-taking (often called com-
petitive) equilibrium is ‘optimal’, fully recognising that it is just one of many Pareto optimal
points. This gives rise to what is now referred to as the ‘First Fundamental Theorem’ of wel-
fare economics — that a price-taking equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient. The use of price-taking
also provides a considerable reduction in the amount of information required by traders
compared with barter. Individuals only need to know the equilibrium prices, whereas in
barter they have to learn a considerable amount of information about other individuals’
preferences and endowments. Of course, this merely describes the properties of an equi-
librium and does not, as Edgeworth was fully aware, explain how it may be achieved in
practice. However, he later showed that a sequence of price adjustments, where trading — at
the minimum of demand and supply — takes place at disequilibrium prices, leads to a point
on the contract curve although precisely where is indeterminate.
Edgeworth then returned to the indeterminacy in barter, asking whether this indetermi-
nacy results from the absence of competition in the simple two-person market. Edgeworth
quickly moved on to examine the implications of introducing further pairs of traders. The
analysis of barter with numerous traders again involves Edgeworth’s stylized description of
the recontracting process of barter mentioned above. With more traders, the importance
5of the recontracting process, apart from allowing the dissemination of information, lies in
the fact that it makes it possible to analyse the use of collusion among some of the traders.
Individuals are allowed to form coalitions in order to improve bargaining strength. Recon-
tracting enables the coalitions to be broken up by outsiders who may attract members of a
group away with more favourable terms of exchange.
The analysis of many traders, where coalitions can be temporarily formed and broken up
by the oﬀer of improved terms from other traders, would appear to present formidable diﬃ-
culties. Yet Edgeworth rapidly demonstrated, again using his famous box diagram, that the
introduction of further similar pairs of traders gradually reduces the range of indeterminacy;
that is, the length of the contract curve shrinks. With a suﬃciently large number of traders,
the range of indeterminacy shrinks to the ﬁnite number of price-taking equilibria. Barter
thus replicates price-taking behaviour. Given that coalitions among traders are allowed in
the recontracting process, a price-taking equilibrium cannot be ‘blocked’ by a coalition of
traders. In this sense the competitive equilibrium is robust.
The argument that a complex process of bargaining among a large number of individuals
produces a result which is identical to a price-taking equilibrium is an important result
that is far from intuitively obvious. The recontracting process can be said to represent a
competitive process, and the contract curve shrinks essentially because of the competition
between suppliers of the same good, although it is carried out in a barter framework in
which explicit prices are not used. The price-taking equilibrium, in contrast, does not
actually involve a competitive process. Individuals simply believe that they must take
market prices as given and outside their control. They respond to those prices without any
reference to other individuals. But the result is that the price-taking equilibrium looks just
like a situation in which all activity is perfectly co-ordinated.
Great stress was placed by Edgeworth on comparison with Lagrange’s ‘Principle of least
action’ in examining the overall eﬀects produced by the interactions among many particles.
The connection with Edgeworth’s analysis of competition, involving interaction among a
large number of competitors to produce a determinate rate of exchange, is clear. The
fact that in the natural sciences so much could be derived from a single principle was
important for both Jevons and Edgeworth. But Edgeworth took this to its ultimate limit
in arguing that the comparable single principle in social sciences, that of maximum utility,
would produce results of comparable value. Referring to Laplace’s massive work, Mécanique
Celeste, he suggested that:
‘Mécanique Sociale’ may one day take her place along with ‘Mécanique Celeste’,
6throned each upon the double-sided height of one maximum principle, the supreme
pinnacle of moral as of physical science . . . the movements of each soul, whether
selﬁshly isolated or linked sympathetically, may continually be realising the max-
imum energy of pleasure, the Divine love of the universe. (1881, p.12)
A strong belief in the value of mathematical analysis in economics, even where the precise
numerical form of the relevant relationships cannot be known, imbues all of Edgeworth’s
work. When this is combined with his strong adherence to Utilitarianism, it is not diﬃcult to
see how Edgeworth was excited to be showing not only why this principle may be accepted in
the form of a ‘social contract’, but how the actions of many utility maximising individuals in
a market can lead to a determinate solution. Thus, while the comparison with Laplace may
seem fanciful to some readers, it was far from fanciful to Edgeworth. These elements provide
the ‘plan’ with which virtually all his work in economics could be viewed. It is no wonder
that Alexander Pope’s statement, in his Essay on Man, that it presents ‘A mighty maze,
but not without a plan’ was borrowed by Edgeworth to describe the competitive barter
process. It also nicely ﬁts Edgeworth’s own oevre. Although he went on to write on a wide
range of economic topics, and to make original contributions to mathematical statistics
which alone would guarantee a lasting reputation, an appreciation of the preoccupations
leading towards, and nature of, this ﬁrst work is important in placing everything else in
perspective.3
It is clear from even a small sample of Edgeworth’s work that the writer brings to it
not just a deep and fertile originality, but also a vast range of knowledge covering natural
sciences and literature. His writing is highly allusive and contains quotations from Greek
and Latin classics as well as well a range of English poets. It displays a sharp wit of a kind
found in no other writing in the subject, and continues to repay repeated reading.
3His economic papers are collected in Edgeworth (1925).
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82 Philip Henry Wicksteed
Philip Henry Wicksteed (1844-1927) was an English economist who was also a Unitarian
theologian (succeeding James Martineau at the Little Portland Street Chapel in London in
1974, and resigning in 1897), translator and classicist (with a particular interest in Dante)
and literary critic.4 Turning to economics after reading Henry George’s (1879) Progress and
Poverty, for many years he gave University of London Extension Lectures on economics (as
part of an adult education programme). Robbins (1933, p. v) makes the point that ‘there
can be few men who have so successfully combined such a wide range of intellectual pursuits
with such conspicuous excellence in each of them’. The greatest inﬂuence on his economics
was Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy, and he can be described, with Edgeworth, as
a disciple of Jevons and a careful exponent of the subjectivist approach in which cost is
interpreted in terms of foregone alternatives rather than as a ‘real cost’. Robbins (1931, p.
229) describes how Wicksteed’s copy of the second edition of Jevons’s Theory, purchased in
1882, is covered with marginal annotations.
Wicksteed’s ﬁrst publication in economics was his 1884 criticism of Marx, the ﬁrst along
Jevonian lines by a British economist.5 He published his ﬁrst economics book, The Alphabet
of Economic Science in 1888. This is primarily a pedagogic work expounding the utility
theory of value, with a long introductory section on basic calculus. In this, he is responsible
for introducing the term ‘marginal utility’ as an improvement on Jevons’s ‘ﬁnal utility’. This
was followed in 1894 by the celebrated Essay on the Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribu-
tion in which, in contrast to the earlier work, he states in the preface that, ‘I address myself
only to experts’, although at the same time ‘without any claim to originality’ (1894, p. 3).
Although the main elements of the marginal productivity theory of distribution, accord-
ing to which (using modern terminology) factors receive their marginal revenue product
(marginal physical product multiplied by marginal revenue, which in a competitive goods
market is equal to price or average revenue), had been proposed by a number of authors,
Wicksteed is famous for his original argument that the total remuneration of all factors will
precisely exhaust total revenue. Hence there is no ‘residual’ available for distribution (in
contrast to the classical approach in which rent is regarded as a residual). This led to the
famous review by Alfred Flux (a Cambridge Senior Wrangler in mathematics in 1887 who,
as a student of St. John’s College, came into contact with Alfred Marshall). Flux made the
important point that Wicksteed had implicitly assumed constant returns to scale, or linear
4Wicksteed’s life is described by Herford (1931).
5This led to a debate with George Bernard Shaw.
9homogeneous, production functions and, in addition, that the result is immediately given
by the application of Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions. For  (1) homo-




 =  (1 ).
Hence for  =1and perfectly competitive markets, the ‘product exhaustion’ result follows.
Flux suggested that, ‘there seems no need for delaying to prove a relation so well known
as this, as Mr. Wicksteed does’. It may have been ‘well known’ to mathematicians, but
Wicksteed was not a trained mathematician; indeed Herford (1931, p. 200) mentions that
he had been taking lessons in calculus from John Bridge, a mathematics tutor at University
College London.
The assumption of linear homogeneity, along with the continuous substitutability of
factors in production, was subsequently strongly criticised by Pareto, Barone and a bad-
tempered Walras who unfairly accused Wicksteed of plagiarism.6 Furthermore, it elicited
t h ef o l l o w i n gc o m m e n tb yE d g e w o r t h ,m a d ei nh i su n i q u es t y l e :‘ T h e r ei sam a g n i ﬁcence in
this generalization which recalls the youth of philosophy. Justice is a perfect cube, said the
ancient sage; and rational conduct is a homogeneous function, adds the modern savant’.7 As
a result of these attacks, Wicksteed himself became somewhat dissatisﬁed with his argument,
though not of course with the main points of the marginal productivity theory.
In 1910 Wicksteed published his massive Common Sense of Political Economy, described
by Robbins (1931, p. 235) as ‘the most exhaustive non-mathematical exposition of the tech-
nical and philosophical complications of the so-called “marginal” theory of pure economics,
which has appeared in any language’. Again, Wicksteed makes no claims of originality,
but this book does contain a strong criticism of the partial equilibrium analysis of supply
and demand, suggesting that it does not pay adequate attention to the role of stocks of
goods. He went so far as to describe the standard diagrammatic analysis as ‘profoundly
misleading’ (1910, in 1933, II, p. 785) and actually stated that there is ‘no such thing’ as
a supply curve. He argued that although it is useful to separate the supply and demand
sides of the market in considering the process of adjustment by which an equilibrium may
be reached, this separation is of dubious value in examining the determinants of that price.
He suggested that:
the cross curves of demand and supply, so often employed by economists, are
really no more than two sections of the true collective curve of demand, sep-
arated out from each other, and read, for convenience, in reverse directions.
6For further discussion of Wicksteed’s contribution, see Stigler (1941, pp. 38-60).
7Edgeworth’s ‘ancient sage’ is Aristotle, who in his Nicomachean Ethics argued that justice requires
equality in all directions.
10These cross curves, then, as usually presented, confuse the methods by which
the equilibrating price is arrived at with the conditions that determine what it
is. (1933, II, pp. 797-8)
The situation he had in mind, along with other major neoclassical economists, was not of
ﬁrms producing only for sale but of exchange. He envisaged the standard exchange situation
in which individuals hold stocks of a good which are brought to a market. His examples
include the results of a harvest, or the ‘catch’ of a ﬁshing ﬂeet (1933, II, p. 787). Those
who hold stocks also consume the good and therefore have a demand for it comparable with
that of individuals who do not hold stocks. This context is thus the same as that of Jevons
and Walras, Mill and Marshall (when considering international trade) and Edgeworth, yet
Wicksteed took a quite independent position: See Wicksteed (1933, I, p. 229-34; 1933, II,
pp. 772-96; 1933, II, pp. 797-800; 1933, II, pp. 822-6). He referred to the conventional
supply curve as a ‘reverse demand curve’ and argued:
I say it boldly and baldly: there is no such thing ... what is usually called the
supply curve is in reality the demand curve of those who possess the commodity.’
(1933, II, p. 785)
Wicksteed’s preferred diagram showed a curve relating the price to the total demand
of possessor and non-possessors (on the horizontal axis). The equilibrium price is then
obtained by the intersection of this total demand curve with a vertical line drawn from the
total stock of the good available. He went on to suggest that:
a change in its initial distribution (if the collective curve is unaﬀected, while the
component or intersecting curves change) will have no eﬀect on the market, or
equilibrating price itself, which will come out exactly the same. (1933, II, pp.
785-6)
However, this result was simply assumed by Wicksteed, who failed to recognise that the
basic assumption, that a change in the allocation of stocks does not aﬀect the total demand
curve, requires very special conditions and generally will not hold: for details see Creedy
(1991). In criticising the partial equilibrium demand and supply analysis, Wicksteed simply
replaced it with another partial equilibrium approach, instead of using the exchange context
o fJ e v o n s ,W a l r a sa n dE d g e w o r t hw h i c hi nf a c tm a d ee x p l i c i tt h es t o c k so fg o o d sh e l db y
traders in exchange.
11Wicksteed’s strong rejection of the supply curve is of course associated with his ‘Austrian’
view that all productive resources are ultimately ﬁxed in ‘supply’ and that cost must be
seen in terms of opportunity cost; see, for example, Hutchison (1953, p. 104). Again, this
is entirely consistent with an emphasis on exchange. As stressed by Fraser (1937, p. 104),
the view of cost in terms of foregone alternatives is ‘merely the extension of the exchange
r e l a t i o n s h i pt ot h ew h o l er a n g eo fe c o n o m i cl i f e ’ ,w h i c hw a so fc o u r s et h ea g e n d as e to u tb y
Jevons. This makes Wicksteed’s approach rather curious.
His interest in Jevons also led Wicksteed to critise Jevons’s discussion of the famous King-
Davenant law of demand, where Jevons provided a functional form which he ‘ﬁtted’ to the
basic data which were presented by Davenant in tabular form. Wicksteed actually recognised
that a third degree polynomial ﬁts the data points exactly, and gave the parameters, adding
that it ‘can hardly fail to stimulate curiosity as to the origin of this most interesting estimate,
and the grounds on which it was formed’ (1933, II, p. 738). He acknowledged the help of
Bridge in ﬁnding the polynomial, using the ‘method of diﬀerences’. Yet it is interesting that
neither Wicksteed nor Jevons recognised that Whewell had earlier given the precise form of
the polynomial, and yet Jevons explicitly referred to Whewell; for details see Creedy (1986).
Wicksteed’s reputation stands because of his serious and extended analyses of fundamen-
tal theoretical questions. Although these analyses attracted the attention of a only a small
number of his contemporaries, they were without question the leaders of the economics pro-
fession. At a time when economics was becoming dominated by established academics, this
was a remarkable achievement by one who was clearly an ‘outsider’. More general readers
are indeed likely to ﬁnd his expansive style diﬃcult to penetrate, yet it is likely that those
concerned with basic questions will continue to ﬁnd much interest and food for thought in
his works.
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